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Convergent Trends in Aggregate and Firm Volatility 
 
Abstract 
This article unearths the determinants of the volatility of aggregate and firm-level production proxied by 
output and turnover respectively. This article re-visits Comin and Mulani’s Note on the diverging trends 
between aggregate and firm volatility. Similarly to their conclusions, I establish that firm volatility is not 
driven by a compositional bias in my sample and that it’s entirely driven by its covariance element. 
Contrary to their conclusions, I find a convergence between firm-level and aggregate level volatility due 
in part to the 2007 financial crisis.  
1 Introduction 
In this article I attempt to increase our understanding of the European economies1 in the period 1997-
2012 by comparing firm-level volatility to aggregate volatility because there is a lot to learn about how 
any given economy functions by comparing how the experience of individual firms is reflected at the 
aggregate level. This article is inspired by Comin and Mulani (Comin & Mulani, 2006), who find that 
trends at the firm-level diverge from the aggregate level, but who also find identical (symmetric) trends 
at the aggregate and firm-level for the US economy in the period 1945-1991. For the European 
economies I’ve discovered that firm-level and aggregate level volatilities converge in this period.  
 
This article analyses the volatility of turnover at the firm-level and compares it to the aggregate output 
volatility. I’ve found that the volatility at the firm level converges with the volatility at the aggregate 
level. This could be due to a three empirical factors: due to sample composition, due to firm-specific 
factors, and due to sectorial determinants. I refute these eventualities, and then discover which 
components of firm-level volatility explain the aggregate volatility. Finally, I use my findings to address 
the theoretical hypotheses advanced by contemporary scholars to explain either convergence or 
divergence between firm and aggregate volatility. 
 
Whereas Comin and Mulani (Comin & Mulani, 2006) find diverging and symmetric trends by comparing 
firm-level and aggregate volatilities, I’ve discovered a convergence between firm-level and aggregate 
volatility. I attempt to increase our understanding of firm-level volatility by comparing it to aggregate 
volatility because this phenomenon speaks directly to a given economy’s fundamental character. 
Namely, how a firm’s experience is reflected at the aggregate level speaks volumes about how that 
economy functions.  
 
There are seven theories in the literature which attempt to explain trends in firm-level and aggregate 
volatility. Comin and Mulani explain their symmetrical trend as due to increasing investment in 
embodied innovations at the expense of disembodied innovations.  Sector-level shocks thus increase due 
to a focus on product rather than fundamental research. Wang and Wen (Wang & Wen, 2009) argue that 
it’s financial development driving this trend. Davis and Kahn (Davis & Kahn, 2008) argue by contrast 
that it’s greater investment in durable inventory that’s the cause for decreasing aggregate output and 
firm-level volatility. This study lends credence to the latter’s conclusions with my focus on non-listed 
firms but doesn’t discover empirical evidence to support Wang and Wen’s claim. Another theory posits 
that it is credit constraints and financial development that contribute to aggregate productivity volatility 
(Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, & Manova, 2010). An associated theory (Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere, & 
Rogoff, 2006), argues that it’s the exchange rate volatility that drives volatility at the aggregate level. 
This study supports the former’s conclusion in as much as quantitative easing policies mark a notable 
decrease in aggregate and firm volatility and its cessation heralds a marked increase in volatility. The 
second study’s conclusions are not verified in this study inasmuch as the question was not directly 
addressed nonetheless covariance of volatility between countries and a break down by country doesn’t 
of volatility does not find evidence of the required magnitude for the theory posited by Aghion et.al. . 
                                                 
1 France, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden 
The contribution of this article to the literature is that it rules out some theories or restricts their domain 
to the data used by those who proposed this theory, whilst offering qualified support for some other 
theories. In addition it finds a trend in the European data hitherto undiscussed. This is the first firm-level 
study to date that looks at European firms, first of all, and looks at the tumultuous 1997-2011 period 
second of all. Europe is woefully neglected in the empirical literature dealing with volatility. Furthermore 
most firms in the sample are small to medium sized firms and thus this study is novel in a third way, 
that is that we’re looking at how the “rest of the economy” behaves rather than how publicly listed 
companies behave. Therefore this study takes the relay from Comin and Mulani’s study in terms of time 
and brings us to a different geography all the while focussing on a different kind of firm.  I discover a 
tendency towards convergence between firm and aggregate level productivity, and notably and almost 
by definition, that there are significant upward trends in volatility during years of financial crises.  
 
The first section of this paper explores the empirical literature pertaining to this field of study notably 
recent studies on the increasing volatility of listed firms, the decreasing volatility of the aggregate-level, 
and theoretical literature on these phenomena. Although there was more attention paid to volatility in 
between the mid-nineties to the mid noughties, relatively few studies were undertaken directly 
comparing the two volatilities , the articles by Comin and Mulani’s and Davis and Kahn’s are the only two 
which directly address this.  
 
The third and fourth sections present this studies’ data and novelty. Whereas previous studies are 
exclusively restricted to data from the USA, this study presents findings based on European data of 
mainly small firms. The fifth and sixth sections present a panoply of robustness checks correcting for 
compositional bias at the firm and sectorial-level and firm-level fixed-effects. The final two sections 
present the principle empirical findings and associated conclusions. We find that the trends mostly hold 
for changes in the composition of the sample.  
 
2 Literature Review 
There’s been more attention paid to the aggregate-level output than the firm-level in the literature 
studied, that mostly focusses on the recovery after the recession of the early 1990s. Oliver Blanchard 
and John Simon argue (Blanchard & Simon, 2001) that the decline in output is driven by a decrease in 
inventory investment, a decrease in consumption and a decrease in government spending based data 
from the period 1947-1981 and 100,000 simulated observations for the 1982-2000 period. They 
focussed on chain-weighted GDP measures to decompose volatility into its standard deviation and 
growth components.  Campbell et.al. discover a significant and positive trend (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, 
& Xu, 2001) in volatility based on the CRSP dataset using 8927 firms to compute market, industry and 
firm-level variances by calculating 30-day T-bill returns divided by the number of trading days of that 
month.  Margret McConnell et.al. argue that it’s changes in inventory behaviour that has driven 
decreasing output volatility (McConnell & Perez-Quiros, 2000) based on a dataset of GDP ranging from 
June 1962 to December 1997. Xavier Gabaix argues that individual firm’s idiosyncratic shocks account 
for a significant share of aggregate shocks (Gabaix, 2011) based on a sample of top-20 firms in 1980. 
Thomas Phillipon (Phillipon, 2003) argues that it may be competitive pressure that drives the divergent 
trend in aggregate and firm’s volatility using the same data at Comin and Mulani, namely the 
COMPUSTAT database from 1965 to 2001. He measured growth rate to examine volatility. Stock and 
Watson argue that it is good luck and better monetary policy that accounts for the great moderation 
(Stock & Watson, 2003) based on 168 quarterly macro-economic time-series from 1959-2001. They 
used NIPA decomposition of real-GDP; based on variables for money, credit, interest rates, and stock 
prices; housing industrial production, inventory, orders, and sales variables; and employment variables, 
they transformed growth-rates to measure volatility and come to their conclusion. Davis et.al argues 
that there’s in fact a convergence between private and publicly traded firms’ volatility based on the LBD 
census for the 1976-2001 period and COMPUSTAT from the 1950-2004 period (Davis, Haltiwagner, 
Jarmin, & Miranda, 2006) by using employment, listing variables, age, growth and size to size- and 
employment- weighted volatility. Another approach focusses on institutional endowments (Easterly, 
Islam, & Stiglitz, 2000) to find that it is institutional endowments that mediate micro-economic variables 
to impact aggregate volatility. This study used simple cross-country differences in volatility from 1970 
until 1997 using output as a proxy for growth and a diverse set of dependent variables including 
exchange rates, inflation and government consumption. Aghion et.al. use a panel of 21 OECD countries 
over the 1960 to 2000 period using appropriate proxies for short-term shocks, long-term productivity, 
and credit constraints as a proxy for financial development (Aghion, Angeletos, AbhijitBanerjee, & 
Manova, 2010). They find that financial development drives aggregate volatility.  
 
3 Data 
This study uses the Amadeus Database newly published in 2012. It contains 891,707 firm-level 
observations from 1997-20011 on an annual basis. It’s a study of exclusively European firms from a 
variety of countries namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. This study 
focussed exclusively on the turnover of each firm although the dataset contained many more variables. 
Before 2002 each measure was entered using local currencies so each of these measures for each 
different country has been converted into the euro using yearly exchange rates. In order to examine the 
volatility of growth at the firm level, annual turnover data is gathered from the sample only for firms 
that have non-zero values for sales for any three consecutive years. Both currently active and currently 
bankrupt firms are kept, and due to the international nature of the dataset, international firms are also 
kept. Only firms with 3 or more consecutive yearly observations were retained because that’s what’s 
needed to create one window to measure variance (see below) and therefore only 301,745 firm 
observations were kept.  
 
The total sales by year and country for the retained firms constitute on average 0.001%, a breakdown 
by country is given in Annex 2 along with some general descriptive statistics. Nonetheless there are 
years, notably the 2005 to 2008 windows where the total sample of firms sometimes constitutes 
upwards of 5% of the aggregate GDP. Therefore we have a sample that’s at best a snapshot of minute 
portion of the economy. Even so the sample is large in number of firm observations and seemingly 
random in its selection of them which is good for analysis. Thus, I will need to control for a variety of 
possible sample-selection and composition bias possibilities. 
 
Summary Statistics 
       Year Number of 
observations 
Mean2                          
2011 0 . . . . . 
2010 0 . . . . . 
2009 10802 135.629 0.1 38.19 1465066 207.8344 
2008 58762 6375.77 0.1 404 374653234 40318.21 
2007 63807 6861.29 1000 425 437798452 41811.52 
2006 65750 3045.04 1000 405.43 200211470 9565.03 
2005 65451 2935.53 1000 390.53 192133536 9358.19 
2004 61476 2834.35 0.11 368.52 174244220 9214.11 
2003 58925 245.095 106 154 14442201 249.6599 
2002 56879 246.313 103 156 14010028 249.2583 
2001 54206 45.17 15.85 32.37 2448482 43.43776 
2000 52188 45.47 15.24 33.39 2373085 41.05117 
1999 16917 37.66 11.46 24.07 637123 46.20644 
1998 1094 44.47 0 16.66 48660 78.25408 
1997 411 39.99 17.34 15.72 16437 70.47851 
Table 1 - Summary Statistics 
                                                 
2 In thousands 
4 Firm-Level Volatility  
 
Consider the time series of a random variable Xt. the volatility of Xt  is defined as the time series of standard 
deviations of 3-year windows of Xt.  Formally we compute the time series for volatility of Xt  as  
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Where     is the average between t-1 and t+1.   
 
For every firm a time series  (         )   where           is represents the growth-rate of real sales for the 
company, the deflator being the PPI – the aggregate producer price index for the European Economic 
Area. These standard deviations are then averaged across all the firms in a year to arrive at the average 
volatility for every year. Therefore we remove the average growth rate for a given firm in a given 3-year 
window and thusly control for firm-specific aspects that affect the growth rate of sales. If on the 
contrary, we would have computed the standard deviation across all the firms, then this cross section 
would have been (more) vulnerable to a compositional bias through the medium of fixed firm-effects. 
 
 
Figure 1- Firm-level volatility for the whole sample 
As illustrated in Figure 1, volatility at firm-level exhibits a persistent ‘leveling’ trend after the boom years 
of the noughties and its correction in 2007. The graph plots volatility per year as a decimal of 
percentages. In order to build a more representative measure, firm-level volatility measures are 
weighted by the firm’s share of turnover of a given year in its country’s total turnover in the sample of 
that same year. This weighted measure is also graphed in Figure 1. Although both weighted and 
unweighted measures display the ‘leveling’ tendency, it’s source may be called into question. That’s 
because it could very well be a feature specific to the sample or the variable in use. Although in this 
exercise a different proxy for performance could not be used, I need to respond to these eventualities. 
4.1 Bias due to Price Divergence 
The levelling of volatility at firm level may be due to differences in the prices at firm level. However, 
price deflators at sector-level don’t exist, therefore I cannot analyse the volatility of growth rates of real 
sales, and must be content with nominal values. To examine the eventuality of firm-level price 
divergence, a subset of our sample is examined. I separated all manufacturing firms to see if there was 
a price divergence at the 2-digit NACE code level. Then four-digit deflators are used to adjust net-sales 
to real measures. Figure 2 presents the average weighted and unweighted measures of volatility of the 
sub-sample of manufacturing firms and compares this to the whole sample on the same graph.  
 
Figure 2 - Comparison of Manufacturing Subsample with Total Sample - Detail 
and whole graph 
 
The figure suggests that the evolution of average volatility is similar to the growth rate of nominal sales 
for the firms in the full sample and for firms in the manufacturing subsample. Furthermore the figure 
shows that the growth rate of nominal and weighted real sales is the same. This result suggests that the 
levelling trend in volatility is not driven by firm-level price divergence. Nonetheless it may be the case 
that price-divergence operates at the four-digit level. Further studies could rule out that possibility by 
using the number of employees as a real measure of growth rate. 
4.2 Bias due to Sample Composition 
The sample is taken from the AMADEUS database for all years from 1997-2011, but the sample 
increases drastically between the years 2001-2007. This is because certain reporting laws can into effect 
or were changed on a country-basis which means that there is an increase in available data notably in 
Austria. As a consequence this raises the possibility that the observed trend is due to a compositional 
bias. Firms that are incorporated into the dataset from that period may potentially be more exposed to 
the financial crisis’ exogenous shock either because their sectors are more vulnerable or due to firm-
specific attributes such as age, size, management competence, independence, debt-levels, or 
provenance. One remedy to this problem is simply to track the evolution of the firms initially in the 
sample’s volatilities, but this would induce a survivorship bias which doesn’t remedy the source of the 
concern. Therefore in order to show that the trend is not due to a compositional bias, four exercises are 
undertaken. 
 
First, the sample of firms is divided up every year into five quintiles according to the level of sales. A 
firm enters a given quintile if it remained in the quintile for two consecutive years. The top quintile, for 
example is defined as follows: 
                  ((             
     ( )             
     ( ))  (             
     ( )             
     ( )))  
Where    and    are consecutive windows.  
 
Next I examined whether the observed trend in volatility is driven by any specific quintile by seeing 
whether or not the levelling effect is a product of averaging with quintiles driving volatilities in opposite 
directions, or whether it’s a pervasive phenomenon across quintiles. Figure3 clearly shows that the 
levelling of volatility is not driven by any specific quintile but rather that it’s pervasive across the sample 
and not restricted to any section of the distribution. Nonetheless, this finding does not fully account for 
the possibility that firms in the sample and in each quintile are composed by firms more exposed or 
susceptible to shocks after 2002: all the quintiles may be composed of firms that were intrinsically more 
vulnerable to 2006’s exogenous shock.  
 
It could also be that it’s in fact firms from a given country instead of firms of a given size that are 
driving the trends in volatility across the sample. That’s why I checked each country against the others 
to see if any given country leads the sample or flattened an otherwise pervasive upward trend. I find 
that there is an averaging effect in the years 2001 to 2005 whereby the Dutch sample lowers the 
aggregate variance whilst the Italian and German samples increase in volatility. Then it’s the turn of the 
Dutch section to be victim of an averaging effect. Nevertheless we see all the countries eventually 
converge. This means that it’s likely that some measure of bias due to sample composition is present 
but that the sample ‘responds’ well to it once the initial ‘shock’ of a sharp increase in observations has 
passed and large numbers of observations become pervasive across countries of origin. 
 
Figure 3 - A comparison of the volatility of different quintiles 
 
Figure 4 - Comparison of Countries to the full sample. 
 
4.3 Firm-specific uncertainty 
As a second exercise to control for the eventuality that firms that enter the sample in 2002 are more 
vulnerable to the financial crisis, I looked for the component of volatility that is not explained by firm-
level characteristics that are changing in the sample. Therefore I ran a pooled regression of the firm-
level standard deviations (   ) on a vector of firm characteristics (   ) that contains the log of the share 
of firm sales in the total of the sample retained by country and the log of the firm’s age: 
                    
  
The residual (   
 ) is then aggregated to produce a time-series of the unpredictable component of firm-
level volatility. This exercise was repeated for weighted measures of variance. Unfortunately a suitable 
proxy for firms’ activity levels was not present in the dataset and this could not be included as a 
component of the vector    . 
 
Nonetheless the observed time series, although able to refute that the observed trend is the product of 
compositional bias, begs the question of whether or not there may be other firm-specific variables that 
account for the levelling trend. Indeed there may be omitted firm-specific variables that lead to a 
compositional bias. To rule out this possibility, I ran fixed-effect regressions3 with firm-dummies to 
remove the observable and unobservable effects of firm-specific variables on volatility. Removing these 
effects thus leave only the orthogonal component of unpredictability to fixed firm characteristics. 
Formally, I ran the following regression where    is the set of firm dummies and     is the set of controls, 
namely the log of age and the firm’s share of sales for the sample: 
                                                 
3 Of a random sample of 30000 firms 10 times (a naïf Monte Carlo experiment) and used their averages 
in order to find the values that asymptotically converge towards the real value. 
                  
  
Figure 4 plots and compares the time series of the unpredictable components volatility of the weighted 
and unweighted pooled and fixed-effect regressions. The figure plots the unweighted pooled effect on 
the left axis and the rest of the regressions on the right axis. As we can see the ‘level’ trend is evidenced 
by the collapse of the curve and we can rule out that the uncertainty is simply the result of including 
more firms in the sample in 2002. If the observed trend was simple the result induced by the fact that 
the firms chosen in 2002 were simply less volatile, removing firm-specific components of all firms in the 
sample eliminates the component that is less volatile for new firms. Therefore if the observed trend still 
persists, we can rule out that a compositional bias is the driver of the trend. 
 
Figure 5 - Residual volatility after controlling for age and size 
 
Figure 6 - Residual volatility after controlling for autoregressive effects 
5 Firm Level Volatility by Sector 
After I verified the robustness of the ‘level’ trend discovered in the volatility of the sample, I analysed 
the volatility by sector. That’s because any given sector might be at the root of the observed trend. 
Thus, to verify that this is not the case I ran the following regressions for each two digit sector: 
                       
  ; 
                        
  ; 
where D is a set of sector specific time dummies. I ran both these regressions on weighted and 
unweighted measures of growth for all sectors. By running all these regressions I can construct a time-
series for the weighted and unweighted average firm-level volatility after controlling for age and size and 
a firm-specific intercept. For each two digit sector, Table 2 reports the average estimated coefficient on 
for each year from the pooled regression without firm-level fixed effects. Table 2 shows that the all 
changes in variance were reflected in each sector, with a notable exception being the computer and 
optical in the wake of the internet bubble and their associated industries namely, fabricated metals like 
rare earth products and non-metalic minerals like quartz, which have coefficients about twice the 
gradient of other sectors. These are joined only one year later by petroleum, together they drive a 
short-lived uptick in volatility at the firm-level between 2001 and 2002. Looking at the evolution of the 
petroleum sector over the full time period leads me to hypothesise that shocks to both demand and 
supply will be compensated in the short run by governments.    
  5.1 AVERAGE FIRM-LEVEL VOLATILITY BY TWO-DIGIT NACE CODE 
    
                         
  UN-WEIGHTED WEIGHTED 
    
SECTOR 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
    Water Collection and 
Supply 
  
0.0097 0.00778 -0.0033 -0.0027 
   
-0.0079 
  
0.0097 0.00778 -0.0033 0.0004 
   
-0.0079 
    Electricity, gas, air, 
steam  
  











    Repair and Installation 
of Machinery and 
Equiptment -0.002 
 
0.0052 0.0053 -0.0035 -0.0023 
 
-0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0057 -0.002 
 
0.0051 0.00538 -0.00345 -0.0023 
 
-0.0004 -0.00124 -0.00574 
    
Other Manufacturing  
  
0.0114 0.0114 -0.002 -0.002 
   
-0.0037 
  
0.0114 0.01138 -0.00197 -0.002 
   
-0.00365 
    Manufacture of 
furniture  
  











    
Transport equiptment 
  






0.0031 0.003 -0.00633 -0.0053 
 
-0.0007 
      
motor vehicles  
  




0.0072 0.0065 -0.00313 -0.0024 0.0001 -0.0001 
 
-0.00551 
    
Machinery 
  




0.0097 0.0098 -0.00236 -0.0018 0.0001 -0.0001 
 
-0.00419 
    
Electrical Equiptment 
  
0.0111 0.0113 -0.0028 -0.0026 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0057 
  
0.0111 0.0113 -0.0028 -0.0026 
 
-0.0004 -0.00038 -0.00572 
    
Computer and Optical  
 




-0.00051 0.0212 0.0212 -0.0012 -0.0009 0.0001 
  
-0.00434 
    
Fabricated Metals 
 




-0.00064 0.0181 0.0173 -0.00134 -0.001 0.00004 
 
0.00008 -0.00392 
    
Basic Metals  
 




-0.00032 0.0126 0.0117 -0.00215 -0.0018 0.00017 
  
-0.00333 
    
Non metalic Minerals 
  
0.0254 0.0263 0.0023 0.0022 




          Rubber and Rubber 
Products 
 




-0.00034 0.0095 0.0092 -0.00183 -0.0014 0.00017 
  
-0.0019 
    
Basic Pharmaceuticals 
  











    Chemical and 
Chemical Products 
  




0.007 0.0064 -0.00169 -0.001 0.00011 
  
-0.00517 
    
Coke and Petroleum  
 
-0.0028 0.023 0.0207 -0.0008 -0.001 
   
  
 
-0.00283 0.023 0.0207 -0.00081 -0.001 
        
      
 
  
6 Aggregate Volatility 
I’ve discovered that the evolution of aggregate volatility converges towards that of the firms’ in my 
sample after the financial crisis whereas during the boom years firm-level volatility increases markedly 
and diverges. Many authors have remarked that aggregate growth has become more stable in recent 
years, and some have suggested that there is an association between the aggregate level volatility and 
non-listed firms’ volatility. Figure 5 plots the time series  ( ) for growth rates of both nominal and real 
aggregate final sales of the European Union 17. The volatility of aggregate sales displays a large 
increase starting from 2007 to 2009 coinciding with rises in firm-level volatility in 2005 and 2007. As we 
can see from the fact that nominal and real GDP growths are similar until 2007, inflation is not a concern 
for my purposes. Inflation becomes an issue in the 2007 to 2010 windows, the duration of the first dip of 
the financial crisis characterised notably by a massive quantitative easing among other non-conventional 
responses.  When this time series is compared to that of the firm-level volatility we see that 
convergence and levelling trends are evident. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Volatility of Growth Rates of Real and nominal aggregate sales 
 
Figure 8 - Volatility of Growth Rate of aggregate final sales and firm-level sales 
7 Variance Decomposition 
To understand the mechanics of convergence in my sample, I’ve decomposed the variance of the 
aggregate growth rate of turnover in the Amadeus Database into a variance and covariance component. 
Firstly I verified that my sample displayed similar characteristics at the aggregate level to those of GDP 
for the European Union. Contrary to aggregate total sales, my sample exhibits a recovery of sorts in 
2008. This is due to the fact that although aggregate total sales was still steeped in recession there was 
a moderate recovery as part of the European Union’s double dip recession that evidently mostly affected 
firms the size of our sample. Another reason is the fact that our sample’s size varies. Both of these facts 
together mean that there is a certain level of noise to the growth rate of the AMADEUS database’s 
aggregate sales. This influence may tend to induce an upward bias in the trend of volatility of the growth 
rate of total sales in my sample precisely at those periods with more observations. This problem is 
particularly evident in the year 2001 of my sample where a sharp increase in the number of 
observations induces a notably sharp rise in the volatility of growth. Another way to observe this 
problem would be to look at lower levels of aggregation, for example two-digit NACE sector levels. 
To conduct variance decomposition, the following notation is introduced. Let     be the growth rate of 
aggregate real sales deflated by the aggregate PPI for the EU17,      be the growth rate of real sales for 
firm i , and     be the share of sales for firm i in the total sales of its country from the AMADEUS sample, 
all in year t. Let      be the growth rate of real sales for each sector m deflated by sector-specific 
deflators. Let      be the growth rate of rate of real sales for each country k deflated by the aggregate 
PPI for the EU17.  Also, let  (       
   ) denote the variance of                for any generic variable Z, and 
    (        
           
   ) be the covariance between                 and                . 
 
Note that      ∑          . Then, using the definition of variance, and assuming that         for all the 
firms i and all the years t, the variance of aggregate growth in year-on-year,  (     
   ), can be 
decomposed into two terms: the first is related to the firm-level variance of turnover (simply the 
variance) and the second reflects the covariances between the growth rates of sales at different firms 
(covariance component): 
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The first part of that equation is the variance component and the second part represents the covariance 




The European economy is experiencing a convergence of aggregate- and firm-level volatility of small and 
medium businesses. This study demonstrates interesting differences between the 1999 crisis, driven by 
the internet-bubble and the 2007 crisis driven by the financial sector’s (partial) collapse. Whereas during 
the internet bubble in year 1999 we can see that variance is driven by the sectoral covariance 
component versus the country covariance component, in the wake of the financial crisis, we see that the 
aggregate variance of the Eurozone was driven by the country covariance component. What’s more the 
2006 financial crisis was preceded by an increase in inter-firm covariance, forewarning of the 
momentous corrections to come.  This fundamental difference between these two events has hopefully 
informed government policy in its wake.  
 
In fact consensus macro-economic policy would explains this quite well. Whereas the first’s response 
focussed on easing the process of correction, the second should and did (in the beginning) focus on 
fundamental arbitrage between the private and public sector spending and compensate the reduced 
private spending. Thus from this perspective, the current focus on austerity doesn’t seem as judicious as 
it’s trumpeted.  
 
Davis and Kahn’s study’s conclusions are in line with the findings in this article. If firms’ revenue is 
further into the future due to increasing investment in durable inventory (Davis & Kahn, 2008), it makes 
sense that they are more sensitive to expectations about the future proxied by interest rates and 
income.  
 
Whereas Comin and Mulani find that McConnell and Perez-Quiroz’s conclusions do not fit with their 
findings, from this study, their explanation of the decrease in volatility of firm and aggregate levels are 
consistent with this study’s findings. They argue that new inventory management methods such as just-
in-time inventory management (which leads to a decline in stocks and losses due to stock levels) are the 
source of a decline of volatility at the firm-level.  
 
Research of macro-determinants of volatility argue that part of the decline in aggregate volatility is due 
to more effective monetary policy that helps stabilise shocks to the economy at the aggregate level. 
Although an increase in the efficacy of monetary policy may account for only 30% of the observed 
reduction in aggregate volatility, we can see that these mechanisms have had an effect at the firm level 
when decomposed. Indeed looking at the 2008 and 2009 windows in our study we find that when 
momentous monetary easing tactics have been implemented in the beginning of the crisis in Europe, 
they did lead to a decrease in the average variance and an increase in the variance is observed once a 
more stringent focus on austerity measures was implemented. This explanation is therefore relevant to 
this study. 
 
Comin and Mulani’s argue that it’s a focus on embodied versus disembodied innovations that may 
explain their observed symmetric trends in volatility at the firm- and aggregate-levels. That’s because 
firms have less incentive to invest in fundamental research than product research, and that means that 
their marketed widgets will demonstrate the commonly observed volatile market reactions: new 
products are more volatile than disruptive innovations. This argument is inconsistent firstly because not 
all disruptive technology gains a foothold (not all great ideas make it to and in the market) and secondly 
because we would expect product-focussed spinoffs and product-associated firms to demonstrate the 
increased volatility they observed. Presumably these types of companies would fall in the AMADEUS 
sample, and our study displays the opposite trend.  
 
Aghion et.al. argue that credit constraints proxied by financial development (Aghion, Angeletos, 
AbhijitBanerjee, & Manova, 2010) play a central role in firm-level and aggregate level volatility. The 
complementary theory of Easterly et.al. would add that it’s a given country’s institutional endowment 
that induces this effect (Easterly, Islam, & Stiglitz, 2000). Although these authors would recognise that 
the effect is less pronounced in developed countries like those found in the Amadeus sample, I find that 
countries with very different levels of financial development like Ireland and Greece have broadly similar 
volatility levels over the time period analysed.  
 
Conversely, it may in fact be the case that what we’re observing in my antagonistic conclusions is the 
divergent character of two very different industrial organisations. Whereas industrial policy or business 
regulation in America is geared towards promoting entrepreneurship and the growth of companies, in 
Europe there are severe impediments to the growth of medium size firms into large ones. These 
impediments include social charges on salaries, restrictive employment contracts, and the loss of tax 
breaks once the Small and Medium size Enterprise threshold is crossed. 
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9 ANNEX 1 : Variance Decomposition 
 
This annex is dedicated to the decomposition of aggregate variance into the variance of sectorial growth, the variance of 
growth between counties, and inter-firm covrariance. The growthrate of the aggregate variable of interest (  ) is related to 
interfirm, sectoral and country growths as follows (    ,         ) by : 
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Imposing the restriction that sectoral and country weights are constant during the interval           
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Expanding and manipulating we obtain the variance-co-variance decomposition: 
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10 ANNEX 2 : Breakdown of Representativeness by Country 
 






































































































1997         1 17 1254700 <0.001 
1998   
   
7 456 1312730 <0.001 
1999   
   
3404 177650 1367005 <0.01 
2000   
   
31976 1650070 1439603 <0.01 
2001   
   
32689 1705342 1495554 <0.01 
2002   
   
33974 11578891 1542928 0.7 
2003 4 1677 224993 <0.001 34496 11689960 1587903 0.7 
2004 23 627432 234708 <0.1 35355 90405639 1655572 0.7 
2005 31 864046 245243 <0.5 35904 93126649 1718048 0.6 
2006 31 896543 259035 <0.5 36064 96784394 1798116 0.5 
2007 30 4061163 274020 <0.5 34767 1.69E+08 1886792 7 
2008 17 2933310 282744 1 30916 1.59E+08 1933195 6 
2009 2 327 276151 <0.001 3498 1192398 1885763 <0.01 
 
  








































































































1997 11 2 1058144 <0.001 41 7562 341139 <0.001 
1998 28 5 1093914 <0.001 133 24549 359859 <0.01 
1999 91 249 1133998 <0.001 442 83107 386193 <0.1 
2000 106 22 1198292 <0.001 480 92910 417960 <0.1 
2001 104 19 1255738 <0.001 527 101970 447731 <0.1 
2002 156 66445 1301873 <0.001 608 253144 465214 <0.1 
2003 158 62836 1341850 <0.001 648 277750 476945 <0.1 
2004 219 1230033 1397728 <0.01 694 27458320 491184 5 
2005 225 1261141 1436380 <0.01 716 27833312 513407 5 
2006 221 1317821 1493031 <0.01 707 28849126 540216 5 
2007 218 1740712 1554199 <0.01 655 1.09E+08 571773 20 
2008 206 1688620 1575144 <0.01 482 79793763 594481 16 
2009         6 2719 573235 <0.001 
  
         
         








































































































1997     1904279   119 149 119937 <0.001 
1998 8 2408 1946465 <0.001 218 247 121985 <0.001 
1999 72 15951 2000200 <0.001 2539 2985 131936 <0.001 
2000 161 29949 2047500 <0.001 2947 3350 137930 <0.001 
2001 370 73777 2101900 <0.001 3196 3502 146428 <0.001 
2002 652 259904 2132200 <0.001 3412 1257597 156614 0.6 
2003 1093 420191 2147500 <0.001 3679 1368418 172432 0.6 
2004 1666 28772853 2195700 1.1 3866 19645823 185266 12 
2005 4072 41761453 2224400 2.3 4037 20923706 193048 12 
2006 4020 42398600 2313900 2.3 4049 22929963 208622 15 
2007 3731 99032012 2428500 3 3993 42038283 223160 20 
2008 3224 77877936 2473800 1.2 3788 41993091 233198 17 
2009 29 12702 2374500 <0.001 186 69451 231081 <0.001 
           
           Sweden 





















































    1997 237 7925 223437 <0.001 
    1998 696 19245 227124 <0.01 
    1999 10365 355570 242796 <0.1 
    2000 16513 595044 268253 <0.1 
    2001 17307 559802 253743 <0.1 
    2002 18064 590033 266740 <0.1 
    2003 18834 617150 278914 <0.1 
    2004 19640 6086709 291634 3 
    2005 20466 6363229 298353 3.2 
    2006 20678 7035023 318171 1 
    2007 20413 12938581 337944 3 
    2008 20129 11424974 333256 3 
    2009 7081 187469 292472 <0.1 
     
                                                 
i In thousands 
ii In millions 
